Abstract: The Minimum Livelihood Guarantee (MLG) system is functioned as the last resort safety net for China's urban poor people and plays a substantial role in poverty reduction. Over the past few years, reforms have been taken to increase the benefit levels and to provide minimum income protection for households which are most vulnerable to poverty. However, so far little is known about how the urban MLG system has developed across regions and how the regional differences have changed over time. Since the administration of the MLG system in China is decentralized, regional differences help us to understand the effectiveness of the MLG system in poverty alleviation. Therefore, this paper provides new empirical insights into the MLG development across 31 regions in urban China between 2003 and 2013. In addition to the widely used indicators like benefit levels and number of benefit recipients, we construct the indicators of MLG replacement rates to measure the generosity of the benefits in relation to income from work. The results show that first, the development of the urban MLG system in China has followed different tracks before and after 2008. Since 2008, the governments have made great efforts to increase the generosity of the MLG system while put more stringent conditions on MLG beneficiaries. Consequently, the MLG standards increased significantly while MLG recipients decreased enormously. Second, the development of the urban MLG programs varies considerably across regions. However, China has shown convergence of the generosity levels of the MLG programs across regions since 2008.
Introduction
The Minimum Livelihood Guarantee (MLG, or Dibao) system provides a last income safety net for poor families' sustenance. 1 The aim of the benefit program is to ensure minimum living standard for poor and vulnerable households (Chen and Barrientos 2006) . Provision of the benefits is based on need and is means-tested. In the presence of rising unemployment and inadequate social insurance benefits in China, MLG scheme has received increasing attention as a safeguard against low income and poverty (Shang and Wu 2004; Wu and Ramesh 2004) . According to the "Twelfth Five-year Plan on the Civil Affairs A large set of literature focuses on the emergence and development of the MLG system in China (e.g. Ngok 2010; Jiang 2013; Leung and Wong 1999; Leung 2003; Leung 2006; Saunders and Shang 2001; Shang and Wu 2004) . Another set of studies put more attention to the adequacy of the benefit scheme (e.g. Du and Park 2007; Gao et al. 2009; Ravallion et al. 2006; Wang 2007) . One general finding is that in spite of its rapid development and expansion, the MLG system is still far from effective in alleviating poverty (Gao and Zhai 2012; Ravallion et al. 2006) . Nevertheless, the MLG system has played a substantial role in reducing poverty over the past few years (Wu and Ramesh 2014) . The ineffectiveness of the system in alleviating poverty may come from two sources. First, the urban MLG system is distinguished from the rural MLG system. In urban areas, the MLG scheme is relatively generous and has become the major tool to help to urban poor out of poverty. However, the urban MLG system is only targeted at urban residents with their household registration (hukou) in the city of residence, whereas rural residents who have migrated to cities are excluded from the urban MLG system (Saunders and Shang 2001; Solinger 2005) . The rural MLG system, on the other hand, is far less developed and is not fully established in many districts (Deng and Wu 2006) . Consequently, a number of eligible families in rural areas and the migrants from rural to urban areas, which are actually most vulnerable in terms of poverty, are not covered by the MLG system (Wang 2007 ).
Regional differences might also contribute to the ineffective MLG benefit system. In China, the administration and implementation of the MLG scheme in China is quite decentralized. Local governments are given the discretion to decide the MLG standards under which the poor people can apply for the benefits. Meanwhile, they have considerable scope to enact their own rules of governing the finance (Chen and Barrientos 2006) . In some less developed regions, the governments usually do not have sufficient financial resources and are tempted to set MLG standards lower than what is needed to meet the households' actual basic needs (Du and Park 2007; Solinger and Hu 2012) . Even though many regions may set adequate MLG standards, there is no guarantee of effective enforcement. In some regions, especially in the west, the gap between the entitled MLG benefits and the benefits actually received by the recipients is large (Gao et al. 2009 ). Therefore, it is important to look at the regional difference to understand the development of the MLG system in urban China. However, so far empirical analyses are relatively rare that little is known about how the benefit schemes evolve across regions and how the cross regional variation has changed over time, especially in recent years. To make a contribution, this study aims to add empirical insights into the development of the urban MLG programs across 31 municipalities, provinces and autonomous regions over the period [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] . As such, this study covers all regions ranging from the more developed eastern part to the less developed central and western part of China. The rural MLG system is not considered as the rural system was not extended to rural poor population nationwide until 2007.
Second, we use the year 2008 as the mid-point. In 2008, the "Social Assistance Law (draft)" was published, indicating that the administration of the MLG system became fully legalized (Zhong 2011) .
After 2008, a series of MLG reforms were taken to increase the generosity of the benefits while specify the conditions to become eligible for the benefits. Splitting the period using the year 2008 also helps us to understand the impact of the global financial crisis on China's MLG reforms. According to Liu (2009) and Zhang (2009) , the global financial crisis caused an economic slowdown and a sharp fall in export growth in China, resulting in rising unemployment and social tensions and instability. The crisis brought needs for urgent reforms on the social safety net to maintain social stability. To the best of our understanding, there is no research exploring the different development paths before and after 2008.
Moreover, we apply the relative convergence test (using the coefficient of variation) to analyze whether the regional differences have been narrowed in recent years.
Third, in the comparative welfare state literature, indicators like total social expenditure, or programmatic expenditure have been widely used since they offer an alternative approach to measure the relative importance of the benefit program (Castles 2008 The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we present the institutional characteristics of the Chinese urban MLG programs. Section 3 describes the data and measures used in the study. Empirical statistics are presented in section 4. In section 5 we do some convergence and correlation tests. Section 6 concludes.
MLG System in Urban China

Welfare protection in China and the Emergence of Urban MLG Program
Soon after its foundation in 1949, the People's Republic of China adopted a universal lifelong employment policy to guarantee the job security of urban workers. Under the lifelong employment policy, urban workers would face no risks of unemployment over their working age. Meanwhile, the urban workers were provided with comprehensive welfare protection through the danwei system (work unit). The danweis included the state-owned enterprises, collectively owned enterprises prior to the economic reforms, state agencies, government departments, and other organizations belonging to the public sector, among which the state-owned enterprises were most typical. The dawei system featured three elements: job tenure (iron rice bowl), egalitarian wage distribution (big rice pot), and a welfare 5 package (Ngok 2010) . According to Ngok (2008) , more than eighty percent of the urban labor force was covered by the danwei system prior to the economic reforms.
The danweis offered their employees and their families comprehensive welfare packages and the welfare costs were taken as the cost of production. Old age pensions, health insurance, paid sickness leave, maternity benefits for women and many other welfare services were included in the packages (Saunders and Shang 2001) . The danwei-based welfare protection system was fragmented in at least two aspects. First, the coverage of the formal welfare protection provision was restricted to urban population.
The state took only residual responsibility for the rural population and the rural social benefits covered only a small proportion of the most desperate people (Gao 2006) . Movement of population between the urban-rural sectors was greatly prevented or impeded by the hukou system (Gustafsson and Deng 2011) .
Second, within the urban population, there is a substantive division between those belonging to the public sector and those in the non-public sector. The public sector provided comprehensive welfare protection to their employees. On the contrary, individuals from the non-public urban sector mainly relied on themselves, their families and the market for social support (Saunders and Shang 2001) . For decades China operated a limited number of relief programs for those who were not included in the danweis, targeting mainly at disabled veterans and the most vulnerable groups, namely the "three nos":
people who have no source of income, no working ability and no family. The benefits were very low and the payment was subject to a means-test.
The market-oriented economic reforms since 1978 brought massive uncertainties and risks to urban workers. By the mid-1980s, many state-owned enterprises were facing a decline in manufacturing, rising competition from the non-public sector, rural industry and globalized economy, leading to mass losses among the state-owned enterprises (Solinger 2005) . To make the inefficient state-owned enterprises to survive in the competitive market economy, the government gradually liberalized the production and management autonomy of the state-owned enterprises. Most significantly, the state-owned enterprises were given the power to dismiss recalcitrant workers. Some workers became unemployed because of the bankruptcy of their enterprises. Other workers were dismissed due to the increasing competition in the urban labor markets. This was because the marketed-oriented economic reforms lessened the restrictions for rural population to migrate and released millions of rural labor from agricultural industry into urban areas. Consequently, former urban workers were dismissed in large numbers. Between mid1990s and early 2000s, over twenty million workers in state-owned enterprises were released from the production process (Ngok 2010 ).
6
The market-oriented economic reforms have a profound impact on the development of the welfare protection system in China as well. The government made great efforts to transform the traditional danwei-based welfare protection system into a multiple-tire social insurance based system since the mid-1980s. The new social insurance system is employment-based, consisting of old age pensions, unemployment insurance, health care insurance, maternity leave benefits and work-related injury insurance. These social insurance programs, together with other welfare programs, such as housing and schooling, were gradually separated from the commercial activities of the state-owned enterprises. The state-owned enterprises were no longer responsible to provide generous welfare programs to their employees. Many urban workers thus became poor even though they were employed as their enterprises had difficulties in guaranteeing the wages or in delivering adequate benefits (e.g. Leung
2003
). 
Administration of the MLG Programs
The Ministry of Civil Affairs is in charge of the administration of the MLG programs at the country level and acts as one of the key policy makers regarding the policy design and changes of the benefit policy (Zhang 2012) . In practice, however, the benefits are actually given by local governments. Variations between municipalities are substantial. Each city has considerable scope to enact its own rules of governing the finance and determining the MLG standard lines (Chen and Barrientos 2006) . In principle, local governments take the main responsibility for underwriting the program. The central government takes on a share of the cost for local governments who cannot finance it (Solinger 2005) . To apply for the MLG benefits, the head of the household should formally submit their application to the local street office, which is a neighborhood-based agency of the district People's Government, or the township government. The local street offices or the township governments assess the eligibility of the claimants at the preliminary stage. The county civil affairs department makes the final decision. Delivery of the MLG benefits is operated by the local residential committees (State Council 1999).
Eligibility Conditions and Activation Requirements
The expansion of the MLG scheme in urban China since the 1990s can best be regarded as the policymaker's response to fulfill the need for income support during the transition towards a market economy. Not only working age people but also old-age people are covered by the MLG system. In urban China, coverage of old age pensions is far from universal. High financial burden of elderly dependents without pensions can lead households to fall into poverty (Saunders and Sun 2006) . Theoretically, three 8 types of targets are covered by the MLG programs: the traditional "three nos"; the unemployed on unemployment insurance or whose entitlement to unemployment insurance has expired with their average household income below the locally decided MLG standard line; or employees, lay-offs and retirees whose working income including living allowances and pensions are below the locally decided MLG standard line (Tang et al. 2003) .
Based on the 1999 Regulation, there are two key determinants to be entitled to the MLG benefits.
The first eligibility concerns family formulation and residency status. Applicants of MLG are required to be urban residents with their non-agricultural hukou in the city of residence. In this respect, the hukou system restricts the welfare provision to households with urban registration status while rural residents who have migrated to the cities are excluded from the MLG system. Although in some regions the hukou system has been reformed, the division between the rural and urban areas is still large.
Second, to be eligible for the MLG benefits, per capita families' total income and assets ought to be below the local MLG standard line. The MLG standard line is computed in accordance with the minimum living standard, which is usually based on expenditure surveys of low income families and the financial capacity of the local government. The 1999 Regulation stipulates that urban residents are eligible for the benefits when household per capita income from all sources is below the local MLG standard line.
Calculation of total household income sums up all monetary income and income in kind, including financial contributions from legally dependents and children. 2 Other factors, namely financial assets, employment status, health conditions and housing are also considered (Du and Park 2007) .
The provision of the MLG benefits is not subject to a time limit, as long as one needs to. In practice, only people who are disabled are provided with regular or long-term benefits. To maintain work ethic, it is usually difficult for the able-bodied to receive MLG benefits or they can only receive short-term benefits. The able-bodied recipients must register at employment agencies and anticipate in public community service activities (State Council 1999) . In Shanghai for example, able-bodied beneficiaries of the MLG program must register at the employment agencies and cannot refuse job offers without any proper reason. Meanwhile, they must participate in vocational training provided by the employment agencies. Those who are unemployed must take part in public community service activities. In case of violation of these requirements, MLG beneficiaries may face an elimination or termination of the benefit 9 eligibility (Huang et al. 2005) . In some other cities, recipients who refuse job offers twice may not be entitled to the benefits (Shang and Wu 2004) .
Determination of the MLG Benefit Level
The MLG standard lines are set by local governments, under which people can apply for the benefits. The In principle, the MLG standard line should be lower than the minimum wage, unemployment benefits and pensions (Leung 2006) . What a family receives is the difference between the total MLG benefits eligible -local MLG standard line multiplied by the number of persons entitled within the household -and the total household income. The equation can be set as:
Eligible MLG benefits = MLG standard line * household size -total household income
Data and Method
Sample of Regions and Data Years
In this paper, we track the development of urban MLG programs across 31 municipalities, provinces and autonomous regions. As such, we cover all urban areas from the eastern, central and western regions of China. We expect variations across regions since the eastern regions are more advanced in social and economic development while western regions are lagging behind. Rural MLG programs are not included.
It was not until 2007 that the rural MLG programs were extended to rural poor population nationwide. 
Expenditure on MLG Programs
To start with, we construct two indicators to measure MLG expenditure. First, we employ the indicator of social expenditure on urban MLG programs as a share of local GDP. Second, the indicator of social expenditure on urban MLG programs as a share of local public expenditure is used to assess the government expenditure preference for supporting the unemployed and poor. According to Castles (2008) , the disaggregated program expenditure offers an approach to measure the relative importance of the benefit program. One-time or temporary social assistance benefits to cover unexpected and urgent needs or regular supplements to cover exceptional needs are not considered in the MLG packages.
MLG Recipients
The coverage rate or take-up rate is of interest since it measures the extent to which individuals manage to receive social benefits for which they are actually eligible (Gao and Zhai 2012) . Existing studies suggest that MLG eligible families often lack access to the benefits or are not willing to apply (Ravallion et al. 2006; Wang 2007) . In this study we focus on the take-up rate since while the administrative databases may record benefit receipt accurately, they contain no information on non-recipients. Specifically, we measure the coverage of the MLG benefits in both absolute and relative terms: the number of MLG benefit recipients and the number of the recipients as a share of local non-agricultural population at the end of the year. As stated above, applicants of the MLG benefits need to be registered as the nonagricultural population with their hukou in the urban areas.
Real MLG Levels
The benefit level is relatively straightforward in measuring the generosity of social benefits, as it is just the amount of cash benefit (Olaskoaga et al. 2013) . We use two types of MLG benefit levels. First, MLG standard reflects the income line needed to meet the basic living standards. This indicator has the advantage that it is not affected by the mis-targeting problem which occurs when eligible households do not receive the benefits or ineligible households do receive benefits (Wang 2007) . Usually the standard lines are adjusted according to the changes in consumer prices and the financial capability of the local governments. We take the MLG standard lines at the end of the year in case there might be adjustment within the year. Second, MLG expenditure per person implies the actual benefit levels spent by local governments on each recipient. This indicator reflects the gap between the standard MLG line and per capita household income of the recipient. In order to compare the benefit levels over time, all benefits are adjusted by inflation based on local urban consumer price index (CPI 2013=100).
MLG Replacement Rates
Minimum income replacement rate is a state-of-art indicator as it allows us to measure the generosity of the benefit relative to income from work. Minimum income replacement rate has been utilized for international comparison across the European and non-EU OECD countries (Wang and Van Vliet 2014) but not for China. Following their practice, we first compute the replacement rate as a ratio of the MLG standard to average wage. The average wage is the average earnings of employment in urban work units.
MLG benefit in comparison with the average wage enables us to indicate how the MLG benefits balance between need and incentive (Gustafsson and Deng 2011) . In China, most MLG recipients are more likely to receive minimum wage instead of average wage since they are usually work dis-abled or low-skilled (Huang et al. 2005) . Therefore, we also compute a MLG replacement rate as the ratio of MLG standard to minimum wage. Figure 2 shows the indicators of MLG expenditure as a share of local GDP and local public expenditure across 31 regions in 2013 grouped into three regions: eastern, central and western regions. In general, variation in MLG expenditure was significant across regions. Low ratios are mainly found in eastern regions, including Zhejiang, Guangdong, Fujian, Beijing, and Jiangsu. High ratios are found in Jilin, Heilongjiang, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, and Gansu. On average, the east had the lowest MLG expenditure while the central had the highest. One reason for the lower ratios in the eastern regions could be that the more developed eastern regions often have higher GDP and higher public expenditure than the central and the west-the denominator effect. In general, MLG expenditure was rather low in 2013.
Development of MLG programs in urban
MLG Expenditure as a Share of Local GDP and Local Public Expenditure
Gansu province had the highest MLG expenditure ratio relative to local GDP, which was lower than 0.5 percent. Regarding MLG expenditure as a share of local public expenditure, the highest ratio appeared in Heilongjiang province, which was around 1.5 percent. intensified China's unemployment problems, causing social tensions and instability. As a result, local governments began to take initiatives for more generous welfare protection programs to maintain social stability (Liu 2009 
Generosity of the MLG Standard Relative to Poverty Lines
Among the low-income countries, a commonly used poverty measure is 1.25 or 1.5 U.S dollars per person per day. Despite its wide use, this measure has two limitations. First, its application is limited when the price varies across different regions and over different time periods within a country. Second, this poverty measure is adjusted in accordance with the purchasing power parity (PPP), which fails to reflect the local cost of living. To overcome these limitations, Meng et al. (2005) In Table 2 we present the local MLG standards and our estimated food, lower and upper poverty lines for the 29 regions in 2013. Almost in all regions the MLG standards were higher than the three types of poverty lines. Guangdong province was the only exception which set a lower MLG standard than the upper poverty line. Therefore, the generosity of the MLG standards has been improving that the MLG standard lines has been effective in poverty alleviation in most urban regions. 
Generosity of the MLG Standard Relative to Labor Income -Measured by MLG Replacement Rates
Although the MLG standards are set higher than the poverty lines in China. The generosity of the benefits in relation to work income, measured by the MLG standard as a share of average wage or 21 minimum wage (see Figure 6) . At the national level, the MLG standard as a share of average wage was 9.4 percent while the MLG standard as a share of minimum wage reached 30.2 percent in 2013. The low ratio of the MLG standard to local minimum wage may reflect the relationship between the three-tier basic income support in China: minimum wage > unemployment insurance > MLG standard (Sunders and Shang 2001) . Unemployment insurance is usually linked to minimum wage, which vary between 70-80 percent of minimum wage (Leung 2003) . Based on the three-tier income support, the share of the MLG standard in minimum wage would be even lower. Moreover, the MLG benefit in China usually does not account for rental cost as the recipients usually have their own dwellings or live in subsidized public housing (Leung and Wong 1999) . Minimum wage, on the other hand, is closely linked to local average wage, productivity, unemployment level, economic development and minimum living expenses, and is especially focused on rural migrants (Wang and Gunderson 2011) . 
Convergence and Correlation Tests
Convergence Test
The descriptive analyses above suggest that the development of the MLG programs has followed different paths before and after 2008 in urban China. Since 2008, the governments have made great efforts to increase the generosity of the MLG schemes while put more stringent conditions on MLG beneficiaries. Consequently, the MLG standards increased significantly while the number of MLG recipients decreased enormously. However, the development of MLG programs varies considerable across regions. Thus the question rises as to how the dispersion across regions has changed over time. To answer this question, this study applies the relative convergence (divergence) test using the so-called coefficient of variation, defined as the standard deviation divided by the mean value of the corresponding data. A drop (rise) in the coefficient of variation suggest a convergence (divergence) across regions (Caminada et al. 2012) . Table 4 
Correlation Test
In Table 5 , we report the correlations between MLG expenditure, MLG recipients and the benefit levels.
The indicator of MLG replacement rate is not included since it is intrinsically determined by the benefit level as well as the work income. We use time series cross sectional data analysis based on the data from all regions over the period [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] . As expected, MLG expenditure is highly and positively associated with the number of MLG recipients. Interestingly, the relationship between MLG expenditure and MLG benefit level is strongly negative. On the one hand, the drastic reduction in MLG recipients could help to decrease the MLG expenditure. On the other hand, after 2008 local public expenditure grew significantly.
However, a large part of the public expenditure increase went to areas which helped to promote the economic growth. On contrary, the relative share of MLG expenditure in local public expenditure decreased. 
Discussion and Conclusion
Overall the past few years, the MLG system in urban China has been largely reformed, especially since 2008. On the one hand, the governments performed the reforms to strengthen the role of the urban MLG system as the last resort safety net for poor people. On the other hand, MLG reforms are needed in the presence of the global financial crisis. The economic slowdown and fall in external demand due to the global recession led to increasing unemployment and social instability, in reaction to which the local governments began to take initiatives for more generous MLG benefits (Liu 2009 The results show that the development of China's urban MLG system varies considerably across regions over 2003-2013. In the more developed eastern regions, the numbers of the benefit recipients are very low. The governments manage to raise the benefit levels albeit with low MLG expenditure. On the contrary, in the less developed central and western regions with limited financial resources, since the benefit recipients are in large numbers, even high MLG expenditure could only maintain low benefit levels. However, differences in the generosity of the benefits expressed by MLG standard as a ratio of average wage and as a ratio of minimum wage across regions are not significant. Nevertheless, although the dispersion of the MLG development across regions is still large, the generosity levels of the MLG programs have been converging across regions since 2008.
The development of the urban MLG system seems to follow a different path after 2008. Since then, the number of MLG recipients has been decreased significantly. Hence, the governments manage to increase the real benefit levels and increase the generosity of the benefits. The generosity of the benefit levels has been improving. In 2013 most regions actually had higher MLG standards higher than the poverty lines, implying that the MLG benefits were adequate for poor people's survival. However, the generosity of the benefits relative to work income are quite low. In an era when economic development has increased the income of most labor, it would be demanding to construct an income redistribution mechanism for assisting those who are underprivileged. Overall, China's MLG policy is still at its early stage. The curtained social expenditure on MLG programs may hamper its role in promoting social development. To improve the adequacy and efficiency of the MLG programs, one urgent problem is to specify the division of the tasks between the central and local governments. Local governments with better situation in the fiscal resources may increase their MLG standards in the presence of declining MLG recipients. For the local governments who cannot afford it, the role of the central government in MLG financing could be reinforced.
Moreover, the urban MLG is based on the household registration status (hukou). Currently, there is a huge number of rural migrants entering the cities. Due to the lack of local hukou, they are blocked from the protection of the local MLG programs. Social rights of the floating migrants for basic needs are usually neglected by hosting governments. Further reforms may be of importance to eliminate the segregation between urban and rural areas and between the public and non-public sectors. After all, the 27 MLG system has become an important supplement to China's employment-based social insurance system and essential to maintain social stability. Finally, this paper focuses on the MLG programs in urban China. Future research might be interesting to explore the development of rural MLG program and its impact of the poverty alleviation in China. 
